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ABSTRACT
In 2002, the Chinese government renewed commitment to rural health. One
experimental insurance program, Rural Mutual Health Care (RMHC), provides
affordable coverage for rural residents where a previous insurance system, Cooperative
Medical System (CMS), was poorly functioning. This study examined how RMHC
affected physician prescribing in Fengshan Township, Guizhou Province, China. Six
village doctors were chosen for study based on prior reviews showing high, average, or
low rates of prescribing errors. 858 prescriptions with the single diagnosis of common
cold were systematic sampled from insured and uninsured patient visits in March-May
2003 (under CMS) and 2004 (under RMHC). Peer physicians reviewed prescriptions for
inappropriate prescribing. X2, Fisher’s exact, and two-tailed t-tests were used to explore
demographic and prescription characteristics. Multiple linear and logistic regressions
were used to model outcomes of: number of medications, cost, injection use, and
inappropriate prescribing with covariates of: patient age and gender, prescribing doctor,
year, insurance, and year-insurance interaction. Results show mean cost decreased from
13.09 yuan in 2003 to 7.22 yuan in 2004 (p<0.001). Cost increased from 7.12 yuan for
the uninsured to 11.19 yuan for the insured (p<0.001). After adjusting for other
covariates, RMHC had lower drug costs and fewer medications as compared to CMS
(respectively, p=0.025 and p=0.001), but RMHC had no significant effect on injection
use or inappropriate prescribing (respectively, p=0.641 and p=0.912). In conclusion, this
study shows RMHC successfully controls medication costs, but likely has little effect on
quality of care. A larger, more rigorous study is needed to assess RMHC’s impact on
quality of care.
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INTRODUCTION
China’s economic development since 1978 open policy reforms has led to
incredible progress and financial success, however, a large disparity now exists between
the rich and poor, especially with regards to health. 800 million out of the total 1.3
billion Chinese currently live in rural areas, but 80% of medical resources are
concentrated in urban areas.1 Fewer than 10% of rural residents have health insurance
while roughly half the urban population has employment-based health insurance.2
Moreover, health outcomes are worse in rural areas: in recent years, infant mortality rates
have increased in some poor rural areas while rates in urban areas continue to decline.2
Realizing this enormous rural health care problem, the Chinese government is now
actively supporting various health care reforms throughout the country.
Historically, the communist government has had two approaches to health care.
In the 1950s, China created rural Cooperative Medical Systems (CMS) to provide basic
preventive and public health services to rural areas. CMS used community-based health
insurance and minimally trained “barefoot doctors” to accomplish incredible
improvements in health. From 1952 to 1985, life expectancy in rural China nearly
doubled, increasing from 35 to 68 years.3 By comparison, life expectancy in the United
States during this time increased just 6 years, from 69 to 75 years.4 In the 1970s, rural
health care coverage reached 90% or higher.5 However, when China introduced
widespread economic reforms in the 1980s, the agriculture sector became decentralized
and privatized. CMS was based on agricultural communes, and, with dismantling of this
financial structure, the health care sector also became privatized and decentralized. CMS

-6rapidly declined, and rural health care coverage dropped from 90% in the 1970s to 4.8%
in 1984.5 Rural providers essentially became private practitioners, with strong financial
incentives governing their actions. For patients, the decline of CMS led to growing ruralurban inequities in health care financing, access, quality, and ultimately outcomes.
In the past 20 years, total health expenditure in China has risen 40-fold, and in
2005, a total of US$91.8 billion or 5.5% of GDP was spent on health care.1 Total health
spending on average increases 15-22% per year while GDP increases 9% a year.6 Of
total health expenditures, out-of-pocket expenditures increased from 20% in 1980 to 54%
in 2005.6 In fact, the percentage of total health expenditure contributed by the
government decreased from 36% in 1980 to 17% in 2004, creating an enormous financial
burden on private payers.1 The relationship between health and ability to pay is welldocumented. Average rural incomes in China are much less than urban incomes.2 Per
capita GDP for Beijing province was 25,523 yuan (US $3190) in 2001, nearly 10 times as
much as that of Guizhou province, a poor rural province, at only 2,895 yuan (US $361).7
A 1998 National Health Services Survey found that 10% of the rural Chinese population
lived below the poverty line.8 Of those in poverty, 30-50% become impoverished as a
result of illness, with costs for one hospitalization exceeding the annual income for
roughly half the rural population.9,10 Disparities between rich and poor even in rural
areas is also quite striking. While the rich tend to spend more absolute money on health
care, the relative costs of health care are much higher for the poor. One study estimated
that in 2003, one hospitalization equaled 42 months per capita income for the poorest
quintile of rural residents as opposed to 9 months per capita income for the richest
quintile.11

-7This financial strain is in fact a huge access barrier. Self-medication is a preferred,
cheaper mechanism of health care for the rural poor, and many patients also refuse
hospitalization even with referrals due to costs. One study found that among patients in
the poorest quintile refusing hospitalization, close to 80% listed lack of finances as the
main reason for non-admission.11 Furthermore, even if rural residents are able to afford
health care, many are unable to access high-quality care. A 1995 study found that 30% of
villages in poor rural areas had no village doctor.12 Another study estimated that onethird of drugs sold in rural areas are counterfeit.13 Poor quality health care coupled with
lack of financial resources to access care only leads to worse health outcomes for rural
residents as compared to urban residents. Under-five mortality in 2002 was 39 per 1000
in rural areas versus 14 per 1000 in urban areas.2 Maternal mortality in 2002 was 72 per
100,000 in rural areas and 54 per 100,000 in urban areas.2 These urban-rural differences
are quite striking when one considers the public health mission of CMS and the barefoot
doctors just 20 years ago.
In response to these problems in rural health care, the Chinese government began
to reevaluate CMS and community-based health insurance programs in the 1990s. In
2002, the China National Rural Health Conference developed policies to increase
financial support to rural health facilities and expand CMS.8 The New Rural Cooperative
Medical Schemes (NCMS) aim to create a basic financial safety net for rural areas using
voluntary community-based health insurance.2 Under this program, central government,
local provincial governments, and individual families each pay 10 yuan (US $1.25) per
person for insurance premiums, with additional government subsidies for the poorest
people.13 Local governments have considerable financial and regulatory autonomy over

-8the specifics of NCMS programs. There are currently over 300 pilot NCMS plans
throughout China. Most plans, however, offer mainly catastrophic health insurance, with
high deductibles, high co-payments, and coverage limited to inpatient care.14
Potential problems in the current NCMS, according to a 2004 World Health
Organization (WHO) report, include lack of a “common, rigorous standardized
framework” for evaluating NCMS programs, adverse selection, overemphasis on
catastrophic illness, and lack of preventive health promotion.15 In general, communitybased health insurance programs (CBHI) have been shown to impact finances but perhaps
not quality of care. A systematic review of CBHI literature found some strong evidence
that CBHI provided financial protection for patients, but weak or no evidence that CBHI
improved quality or efficiency of health care.16 Similarly, one study in China found that
insurance status had significant associations with medications, costs, and quality of care.
Insured patients received fewer numbers of prescribed medications, but were prescribed
more expensive medications and thus spent more total money on medications per visit.17
Whether these expensive medications were more or less appropriate treatments was
undeterminable.
Overuse of certain medications is both consumer and provider-driven. Selfmedication, patient demand for antibiotics, non-adherence, and cultural preferences for
injections all contribute to consumer demand for medications in many developing
countries.18 Providers, in turn, have strong financial incentives for over-prescribing. In
Asia, out-of-pocket spending makes up roughly 75% of drug expenditures, with most of
this money going to private providers.19 Many countries have separated medical services
from pharmaceutical sales to lower financial incentives for inappropriate prescribing, but
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found significant associations between health insurance and prescriptions of antibiotics:
uninsured patients received more antibiotics and injections, but physicians prescribed
newer, more expensive antibiotics for insured patients.21 In another study, providers
actually admitted to prescribing more expensive antibiotics to patients with health
insurance and to those who could afford to pay.22 In fact, 55% of inpatient and 70% of
outpatient revenues in rural Chinese health facilities come from drug sales, as compared
to 50% in urban facilities.21 Moreover, markups for prescription drugs can be as high as
40-80% per a WHO report on rural China.23
Inappropriate prescribing not only increases costs for patients, but also has grave
public health consequences such as adverse drug events and antibiotic resistance.18
Adverse drug events cause an estimated 10,000 deaths annually in the UK, and
medication errors cause an estimated 7,000 deaths every year in the US.24, 25 Studies in
Hong Kong, Bangkok, and South Korea have found that antibiotics are prescribed for as
much as 60-89% of outpatient visits for cold and flu symptoms.26, 27 A 2000 study in
rural China showed that 61% of medications prescribed for influenza were unnecessary.28
Furthermore, rates of antibiotic resistance are higher in Asia than in other parts of the
world.29 Prevalence of penicillin-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae is as high as 75%
in South Korea as compared to 43% in France and a low 7% in Germany.30,31
Erythromycin-resistant S. pneumoniae prevalence is also quite high in Asia: 92.1% in
Vietnam, 80.6% in Korea, and 73.9% in China.32 Thus, inappropriate prescribing by
physicians has potential negative impacts on both health care costs and outcomes.

- 10 Most of the NCMS pilot programs are catastrophic insurance schemes focusing
very little on changing actual health care costs or physician prescribing behavior. One
unique pilot NCMS program is Rural Mutual Health Care (RMHC), a rural healthcare
insurance experiment led by Harvard and Yale faculty researchers in collaboration with
the Chinese government. RMHC is voluntary, subsidized, and locally-managed
community-based health insurance, with a strong focus on prevention and primary
care.2,13 RMHC research funds pay 20 yuan per person (the equivalent of the NCMS
government share) while enrollees contribute 10 yuan per person, with exemptions for
the poor. Local township RMHC offices have board members chosen from the
community, and these offices control finances, benefits packages, hiring of selected
village doctors, and contracts with local hospitals. RMHC has several cost-control
mechanisms to increase financial protection for members and to decrease financial
incentives for inappropriate prescribing. Payment to outpatient providers consists of
fixed salaries, fee-for-visit reimbursements, and bonuses at the end of the year with any
remaining funds. In addition, providers are required to buy drugs from RMHC, follow an
essential drug list, and sell drugs at cost to patients. Local RMHC offices periodically
evaluate village doctors to ensure proper reimbursements and quality care.
To date, studies on RMHC have looked at baseline poverty and ill health, adverse
selection, and unequal distribution of benefits, but none have addressed RMHC’s impact
on cost to patients or health outcomes.33, 34, 35
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This pilot study aims to examine how RMHC affects physician prescribing
practices both in terms of costs to patients and quality of care. Health outcomes like
mortality or morbidity require long observation times, thus inappropriate prescribing
could be a possible proxy for quality of care. This research study tests the feasibility of
using inappropriate prescribing for common colds to measure RMHC’s impact on quality
of care.
There are two sets of hypotheses. First, RMHC reduced medication costs for
members as compared to uninsured RMHC patients and compared to the old CMS
insurance. Second, RMHC reduced inappropriate prescribing for members as compared
to uninsured RMHC patients and compared to the old CMS insurance.

- 12 METHODS
Background
Details of RMHC are described in these referenced previous studies.13, 33, 34, 35 In
brief, two of the poorest provinces in China, Guizhou and Shanxi Provinces, were chosen
as sites for a voluntary community-based health insurance program, Rural Mutual Health
Care. In 2002, RMHC was implemented by a Harvard-Yale research team in conjunction
with the local Kaiyang County Public Health Office in Fengshan Township, part of
Kaiyang County in Guizhou Province. RMHC used research funds to simulate the
government contribution for rural insurance, 20 yuan per capita, and any additional
government subsidies for the poorest residents. Enrollees, in turn, contributed 10 yuan.
Benefits packages included different levels of co-payments for prescription medications
and outpatient visits to the local village doctor as well as reduced rates for inpatient
hospitalizations. Several cost-control mechanisms were built into RMHC, as detailed in
prior sections.
This study focused specifically on the RMHC site of Fengshan Township.
Fengshan is comprised of 26 villages that are served by one township hospital and 56
village doctors. Not all village doctors are hired by RMHC. In 2001, Fengshan had a
population of 37,000 and annual income per capita of 2000 yuan (US $275). In 2003,
Fengshan’s RMHC enrollment was close to 70%, and 11% of the poorest residents were
fully subsidized by RMHC.13, 35
Prior RMHC evaluation of village doctors in January-February 2004 showed rates
of inappropriate prescribing ranging from as low as 1% to as high as 59%. Criteria for
inappropriate prescribing used for this evaluation included incorrect medication usage as
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RMHC doctors. Instead, six doctors were chosen based on the prior evaluation as a
representative sample of village doctors hired by RMHC. Two doctors had low rates of
inappropriate prescriptions, one doctor from Sanhe village at 5% and one from Yongxing
village at 4%. Two doctors had average rates of inappropriate prescriptions, one
Duoyang village doctor and one Anping village doctor both at 14%. Two doctors had
high rates of inappropriate prescriptions, one Guaizhai village doctor and one Xinhua
doctor both at 59%.

Sampling of prescriptions
Data collection occurred during July-August 2004. The above-selected doctors in
6 villages – Anping village, Duoyang village, Guaizhai village, Sanhe village, Xinhua
village, and Yongxing village – were asked to submit all clinic prescription records for
two different time periods. Prescriptions were selected from: March-May 2003 before
implementation of RMHC in these villages, and March-May 2004 after RMHC
implementation. Choosing the same time period of March-May for each year was
intended to reduce confounding from seasonal variability of disease. Within each time
period, prescriptions were collected for uninsured and insured patients (under CMS and
RMHC for respective time periods). RMHC and the prior CMS insurance programs both
required doctors to keep carbon copies of prescriptions for reimbursement. Some, but not
all, doctors also kept records of uninsured patient visits.
Out of all the prescriptions collected, only those with the single diagnosis of “gan
mao” or “common cold” were selected for this study. Prescription records with multiple
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diagnosis for this study because it is the most common diagnosis given to patients by
village doctors, representing over half of all clinic visits, and because all doctors should
be trained to adequately treat the common cold. The original goal was to systematically
sample 30-60 common cold prescriptions per physician per insurance group. If the total
number of available prescriptions exceeded 60, then one out of every x (x being the total
divided by 60) prescriptions were selected. Ultimately, a total of 858 prescriptions with
the single diagnosis of “common cold” were sampled for this study.
Each prescription sheet actually functioned more like a clinic visit note because it
listed patient diagnosis, symptoms, all medications and dosages, and cost for that visit.
The following data were recorded per prescription sheet: prescribing doctor, visit date,
patient’s age, patient’s gender, patient’s insurance status, diagnosis, symptoms (if
available), each drug prescribed, total number of drugs prescribed, use of any injections,
and total price of all drugs.
Main outcome measures used for this pilot study were: total number of
medications per prescription/visit, total cost of prescription, use of injections, and
inappropriate prescribing for common cold, based on peer physician review. Number of
medications and total cost are objective, quantitative measures of physician prescribing
behavior, while injection use and inappropriate prescribing are subjective surrogates for
assessing quality of care.

- 15 Peer review of prescriptions for inappropriateness
Each prescription was reviewed by one of two Kaiyang County Health
Department physicians. The reviewers gave each prescription a binary score of
appropriate or inappropriate medication usage based on all the information recorded on
the prescription sheet: patient diagnosis, symptoms, and age. Criteria for labeling a
prescription “inappropriate” were: incorrect use of a prescribed drug, incorrect dose,
incorrect drug delivery (oral versus injection/intravenous), drug-drug interactions, and
redundant use of drugs. This pilot study, unlike the prior RMHC physician evaluation,
did not use incorrect billing or overpricing of medications as criteria for
inappropriateness of prescriptions.
There were several limitations to the objectiveness of the peer reviewing process
which this pilot study was unable to address due to funding and time constraints. No
prescriptions were reviewed by both physicians to check for inter-observer reliability. In
addition, the two health department physicians were also involved in overall RMHC
management. They thus had prior knowledge and possible biases towards the selected
village doctors. It was not possible to blind the two reviewing physicians to prescribing
doctor or patient insurance status because that information was written on the
prescriptions. Peer reviewers were also not blinded to this study’s objectives because
soliciting their help required explaining study aims. Similarly, village doctors were told
of study aims when prescriptions were collected from their offices.

- 16 Statistical Analysis
Prescription data was entered into Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Corp, Seattle, WA)
and converted to Intercooled Stata version 9.0 (Stata Corp, College Station, TX) for all
subsequent analyses. Age was first analyzed as a continuous variable and then stratified
into 3 categories: age ≤ 15, age 16-45, and age > 46. Cost was transformed to logcost.
Background characteristics between groups were analyzed using X2 tests for difference in
proportions and Fisher’s exact test for categorical variables. Two-tailed t-tests with
unequal groups were used for continuous variables. Comparisons were made between
2003 (under CMS insurance, before RMHC implementation) and 2004 (after RMHC
implementation); between insured and uninsured patient prescriptions regardless of
insurance program; between CMS insured and RMHC insured patient prescriptions; and
between uninsured 2003 (not enrolled in CMS) and uninsured 2004 (not enrolled in
RMHC) patient prescriptions.
Four multiple regression models were used. First, multiple linear regression was
performed on the number of medications as a function of patient age, patient gender,
village doctor, use of any injections, year, insurance, and the interaction of
year*insurance. Second, multiple linear regression was also performed on logcost using
the same covariates as above. Third, multiple logistic regression was performed on use
of any injections using covariates of age, gender, village doctor, number of medications,
year, insurance, and year*insurance. Fourth, multiple logistic regression was performed
on the binary outcome of prescription appropriateness or inappropriateness using the
same covariates used with multiple linear regression. Regarding village doctors, the
tables show regressions with Anping village as the reference village.
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General Information
A total of 858 prescriptions with single diagnosis of common cold were collected.
414 prescriptions were from 2003 pre-RMHC implementation and, of these, 272 were for
insured CMS and 142 for uninsured patients. 444 prescriptions were from 2004 postRMHC implementation and, of these, 301 were for insured RMHC and 143 for uninsured
patients. Table 1 lists numbers of prescriptions collected by village doctor and insurance
category. The number of prescriptions collected per category ranges from 0 to 59.

Table 1: Overall Prescription and Demographic Characteristics
Number of prescriptions collected
Villages
Anping
Duoyang
Guaizhai
Sanhe
Xinhua
Yongxing
Total
Patients
Age
Age ≤ 15
Age 16-45
Age > 46
Gender
Male
Female

Year 2003 (under CMS)
Uninsured
Insured
0
55
29
51
49
52
36
52
0
28
28
34
142
272

Year 2004 (under RMHC)
Uninsured
Insured
42
56
19
52
34
59
45
49
3
37
0
48
143
301

Mean 33.72 years, Range 0-86 years
273 (31.8%)
262 (30.5%)
323 (37.7%)
451 (52.6%)
407 (47.4%)

Total
153
151
194
182
68
110
858
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Prescriptions
Total number of
Mean 5.79, Range 1-18
drugs per visit
Cost

Mean 9.94 yuan, Range 0.36-52.74 yuan

Injections
None
>1 injection

213 (24.8%)
645 (75.2%)

Appropriateness
Appropriate
Inappropriate

625 (72.8%)
233 (27.2%)

Table 1 also lists the overall demographic characteristics for this data set. Patient
age ranged from 0 to 86 years, with a mean age of 33.72. Shapiro-Wilk normality test for
age showed a non-normal distribution (z=8.549, p<0.001). Closer examination of age
revealed a tri-modal distribution, with peaked at roughly 5, 35, and 55 years. Three age
categories were created for subsequent data analysis – age ≤ 15, age 16-45, and age > 46.
These age categories roughly correlate to school-age, young adults/middle-age, and older
patients. In this data set, 31.8% of patients were age ≤ 15; 30.5% were age 16-45; and
37.7% were age > 46. Shapiro-Wilk tests showed normal distributions within these
categories: age ≤ 15 (z=0.756, p=0.225), age 16-45 (z=1.081, p=0.140), age > 46
(z= -0.921, p=0.821).
Regarding other variables, 52.6% of all prescriptions were for male patients.
Total number of medications per prescription ranged from 1 to 18, with a mean of 5.79.
Total cost per prescription ranged from 0.36 (US $0.05) to 52.74 yuan (US $6.59), with a
mean cost of 9.94 yuan (US $1.24). Cost was the only variable with missing values; 31
prescriptions had no cost listed. All 31 of these prescriptions were for uninsured CMS
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Use of injections was quite high: 75.2% of all prescriptions had at least one injection or
intravenous medication. In terms of prescribing inappropriateness, 27.2% of all
prescriptions had at least one inappropriately prescribed medication.

Comparison of 2003 versus 2004 prescriptions
Table 2 compares 2003 (pre-RMHC implementation) with 2004 (post-RMHC
implementation) data. As expected by results in Table 1, there is a statistically significant
difference between the number of prescriptions collected per village doctor (X2=16.019,
p=0.007). There is also a significant difference in mean age between the two years: 30.05
years in 2003 versus 37.13 years in 2004 (t=-4.574, p<0.001). Significantly more older
patients were seen in 2004 than in 2003: 43.2% prescriptions were for age > 46 in 2004
versus 31.6% in 2003; 32.7% were for age 16-45 in 2004 versus 28.3% in 2003; and
24.1% were for age ≤ 15 in 2004 versus 40.1% in 2003 (X2=26.247, p<0.001).
As for other variables in Table 2, no significant difference existed for gender
distribution between 2003 and 2004 data (X2=0.106, p=0.744). Mean number of
medications per prescription was slightly higher in 2003, but this difference was not
statistically significant (t=1.708, p=0.088). Mean cost of prescriptions significantly
decreased from 13.09 yuan in 2003 (US $1.64) to 7.22 yuan in 2004 (US $ 0.90) (t=8.217,
p<0.001). Use of injections significantly decreased from 87.9% in 2003 to 63.3% in
2004 (X2=69.665, p<0.001). There was actually no significant difference in proportion
of inappropriate prescriptions between the two years (X2=0.975, p=0.324).
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2003 Pre2004 PostTotal
X2 or
RMHC
RMHC
T-test
Villages
Anping
55 (13.3%)
98 (22.1%)
153 (17.8%)
X2:
Duoyang
80 (19.3%)
71 (16.0%)
151 (17.6%)
16.019
Guaizhai
101 (24.4%)
93 (20.9%)
194 (22.6%)
Sanhe
88 (21.3%)
94 (21.2%)
182 (21.2%)
Xinhua
28 (6.8%)
40 (9.0%)
68 (7.9%)
Yongxing
62 (15.0%)
48 (10.8%)
110 (12.8%)
Patients
Mean Age in
years (95% CI)

P-value
0.007

30.05
(27.86, 32.25)

37.13
(35.02, 39.25)

33.72
(32.18, 35.25)

T: -4.574

<0.001

166 (40.1%)
117 (28.3%)
131 (31.6%)

107 (24.1%)
145 (32.7%)
192 (43.2%)

273 (31.8%)
262 (30.5%)
323 (37.7%)

X2 :
26.247

<0.001

Gender
Male
Female

220 (53.1%)
194 (46.9%)

231 (52.0%)
213 (48.0%)

451 (52.6%)
407 (47.4%)

X2: 0.106

0.744

Prescriptions
Mean number of
drugs (95% CI)

5.93
(5.73, 6.14)

5.65
(5.39, 5.90)

5.79
(5.62, 5.95)

T: 1.708

0.088

Mean cost in yuan
(95% CI)

13.09
(11.85, 14.32)

7.22
(6.55, 7.89)

9.94
(9.24, 10.64)

T: 8.217

<0.001

Injections
None
>1 injection

50 (12.1%)
364 (87.9%)

163 (36.7%)
281 (63.3%)

213 (24.8%)
645 (75.2%)

X2 :
69.665

<0.001

308 (74.4%)
106 (25.6%)
414

317 (71.4%)
127 (28.6%)
444

625 (72.8%)
233 (27.2%)
858

X2: 0.975

0.324

Age ≤ 15
Age 16-45
Age > 46

Appropriateness
Appropriate
Inappropriate
Total number of
prescriptions

Comparison of insured (both RMHC and CMS) versus uninsured patients
Table 3 combines data from both 2003 and 2004, CMS and RMHC, to compare
all uninsured (285 prescriptions) versus insured (573 prescriptions). Patient age and
gender, village doctor, use of injections, and prescription cost were all statistically
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differences existed between the percentage of insured versus uninsured prescriptions
collected per village doctor (X2=49.313, p<0.001). Mean age for the insured was 37.67
years, much older than the uninsured at 25.76 years (t=-7.553, p<0.001). For age > 46,
46.6% were insured versus 19.7% uninsured; for age 16-45, 27.9% were insured versus
35.8% uninsured; and for age ≤ 15, 25.5% were insured versus 44.6% uninsured
(X2=62.352, p<0.001). Gender was also significantly different; for the insured, 51.0%
were for female patients and 49.0% for male patients, whereas for uninsured prescriptions,
only 40.3% were for female patients and 59.7% for male patients (X2=8.591, p=0.003).
The average number of medications per prescription did not statistically differ
between insured and uninsured groups (t=-1.597, p=0.111). Mean cost for uninsured
patients was 7.12 yuan (US $0.89), significantly lower than the mean cost of 11.19 yuan
(US $1.40) for insured patients (t=-5.910, p<0.001). As for injections, 84.9% of
uninsured patients received injections as compared to 70.3% of insured patients
(X2=21.682, p<0.001). The proportion of inappropriate prescriptions did not
significantly differ between insured and uninsured patients (X2=1.159, p=0.282).

Table 3: Demographic and Prescription Characteristics by Insurance Status
Uninsured
Insured
Total (%)
X2 or
P-value
T-test
Villages
Anping
42 (14.7%)
111 (19.4%)
153 (17.8%)
X2 :
<0.001
Duoyang
48 (16.8%)
103 (18.0%)
151 (17.6%)
49.313
Guaizhai
83 (29.1%)
111 (19.4%)
194 (22.6%)
Sanhe
81 (28.4%)
101 (17.6%)
182 (21.2%)
Xinhua
3 (1.1%)
65 (11.3%)
68 (7.9%)
Yongxing
28 (9.8%)
82 (14.3%)
110 (12.8%)
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Uninsured
Insured
Total (%)
X2 or T
P-value
Patients
Mean Age in
25.76
37.67
33.72
T: -7.553 <0.001
years (95% CI)
(23.29, 28.24) (35.81, 39.54) (32.18, 35.25)
127 (44.6%)
102 (35.8%)
56 (19.7%)

146 (25.5%)
160 (27.9%)
267 (46.6%)

273 (31.8%)
262 (30.5%)
323 (37.7%)

X2 :
62.352

<0.001

Gender
Male
Female

170 (59.7%)
115 (40.3%)

281 (49.0%)
292 (51.0%)

451 (52.6%)
407 (47.4%)

X2: 8.591

0.003

Prescriptions
Mean number of
drugs (95% CI)

5.60
(5.33, 5.87)

5.88
(5.67, 6.09)

5.79
(5.62, 5.95)

T: -1.597

0.111

Mean cost in yuan
(95% CI)

7.12
(6.09, 8.14)

11.19
(10.30, 12.08)

9.94
(9.24, 10.64)

T: -5.910

<0.001

Injections
None
>1 injection

43 (15.1%)
242 (84.9%)

170 (29.7%)
403 (70.3%)

213 (24.8%)
645 (75.2%)

X2 :
21.682

<0.001

201 (70.5%)
84 (29.5%)
285

424 (74.0%)
149 (26.0%)
573

625 (72.8%)
233 (27.2%)
858

X2: 1.159

0.282

Age ≤ 15
Age 16-45
Age > 46

Appropriateness
Appropriate
Inappropriate
Total number of
prescriptions

Comparison of CMS insured versus RMHC insured prescriptions
Of the 858 prescriptions collected, 272 were for CMS insured (2003, pre-RMHC
implementation) patients and 301 for RMHC (2004) patients. Table 4 shows that age,
use of injections, mean number of medications per prescription, and mean cost were
significantly differ between the two insurance groups. There was no significant
difference between the numbers of CMS versus RMHC insured prescriptions collected by
village doctor (X2=2.725, p=0.742). Mean age of RMHC insured prescriptions was
significantly higher, 41.25 years, than for CMS insured prescriptions, 33.71 years
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38.2% of CMS; 25.3% of RMHC were for age 16-45 versus 30.9% of CMS; and 20.6%
of RMHC were for age ≤ 15 versus 30.9% of CMS (X2=15.324, p<0.001). There was no
significant difference in gender distribution for RMHC versus CMS insured prescriptions
(X2=1.143, p=0.285).
In terms of prescription characteristics, significantly fewer drugs were used for
RMHC than CMS insured patients, mean of 5.54 versus 6.25 medicines per prescription
(t=3.392, p<0.001). Also, RMHC prescriptions had significantly lower costs than CMS
prescriptions, 7.95 yuan versus 14.78 yuan (t=7.761, p<0.001). Use of injections also
significantly decreased under RMHC as opposed to CMS, 56.5% of RMHC versus 85.7%
of CMS (X2=58.319, p<0.001). However, proportion of inappropriate prescriptions did
not significantly differ between the two insurance categories; overall, 26.0% of insured
prescriptions had one inappropriately prescribed medication (X2=0.271, p=0.603).

Table 4: Demographic and Prescription Characteristics comparing CMS insured
versus RMHC insured
CMS insured
RMHC
Total (%)
X2 or
P-value
insured
T-test
Villages
Anping
55 (20.2%)
56 (18.6%)
111 (19.4%)
X2: 2.725 0.742
Duoyang
51 (18.7%)
52 (17.3%)
103 (18.0%)
Guaizhai
52 (19.1%)
59 (19.6%)
111 (19.4%)
Sanhe
52 (19.1%)
49 (16.3%)
101 (17.6%)
Xinhua
28 (10.3%)
37 (12.3%)
65 (11.3%)
Yongxing
34 (12.5%)
48 (15.9%)
82 (14.3%)
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versus RMHC insured (cont)
CMS insured
RMHC
Total (%)
X2 or T
P-value
insured
Patients
Mean Age in
33.71
41.25
37.67
T: -4.025 <0.001
years (95% CI)
(31.07, 36.36) (38.68, 43.82) (35.81, 39.54)
84 (30.9%)
84 (30.9%)
104 (38.2%)

62 (20.6%)
76 (25.3%)
163 (54.1%)

146 (25.5%)
160 (27.9%)
267 (46.6%)

X2:
15.324

<0.001

Gender
Male
Female

127 (46.7%)
145 (53.3%)

154 (51.2%)
147 (48.8%)

281 (49.0%)
292 (51.0%)

X2: 1.143

0.285

Prescriptions
Mean number of
drugs (95% CI)

6.25
(6.00, 6.51)

5.54
(5.21, 5.87)

5.88
(5.67, 6.09)

T: 3.392

<0.001

Mean cost in yuan
(95% CI)

14.78
(13.29, 16.27)

7.95
(7.07, 8.83)

11.19
(10.30, 12.08)

T: 7.761

<0.001

Injections
None
>1 injection

39 (14.3%)
233 (85.7%)

131 (43.5%)
170 (56.5%)

170 (29.7%)
403 (70.3%)

X2 :
58.319

<0.001

204 (75.0%)
68 (25.0%)
272

220 (73.1%)
81 (26.9%)
301

424 (74.0%)
149 (26.0%)
573

X2: 0.271

0.603

Age ≤ 15
Age 16-45
Age > 46

Appropriateness
Appropriate
Inappropriate
Total number of
prescriptions

Comparison of 2003 uninsured versus 2004 uninsured patients
Table 5 shows demographic and prescription characteristics for 2003 uninsured
(not enrolled in CMS) and 2004 uninsured (not enrolled in RMHC) data. A total of 142
prescriptions were collected for uninsured patients in 2003 and 143 for uninsured patients
in 2004. The number of uninsured 2003 and 2004 prescriptions available for analysis
significantly differed by village doctor: Anping and Xinhua had no records for 2003
uninsured patient visits; Xinhua only had 3 records for 2004 uninsured patients; and
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uninsured patients was significantly older in 2004 than in 2003; mean age in 2004
uninsured was 28.47 years versus 23.04 years in 2003 (t=-2.167, p=0.031); 20.3% were
age > 46 in 2004 versus 19.0% in 2003; 48.3% were age 16-45 in 2004 versus 23.2% in
2003; and 31.5% were age ≤ 15 in 2004 versus 57.7% in 2003 (X2=23.554, p<0.001). As
for gender, 2004 uninsured prescriptions were composed of 46.1% female and 53.9%
male patients as compared to 2003 uninsured prescriptions, where 34.5% were female
and 65.5% were male patients (X2=4.015, p=0.045).
Mean number of drugs significantly increased from 2003 to 2004 for uninsured
patients, but mean costs of prescriptions significantly decreased overall. In 2003, mean
number of medications per patient visit was 5.32, which increased to 5.87 in 2004
(t=-2.027, p=0.044). However, while number of medications increased from 2003 to
2004, mean costs decreased. Mean costs of prescriptions for 2003 uninsured was 8.94
yuan, which significantly decreased to 5.70 yuan in 2004 (t=2.919, p=0.004). Use of
injections significantly decreased from 2003, where 92.3% of all prescriptions had at
least one injection, to 2004 with 77.6% (X2=11.905, p=0.001). The only variable not
statistically significantly different between the two groups was proportion of
inappropriate prescribing, which was 29.5% overall (X2=1.002, p=0.317).
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versus 2004 uninsured
2003
2004
Total (%)
X2 or
P-value
uninsured
uninsured
T-test
Villages
Anping
0 (0%)
42 (29.4%)
42 (14.7%)
X2:
<0.001
Duoyang
29 (20.4%)
19 (13.3%)
48 (16.8%)
78.792
Guaizhai
49 (34.5%)
34 (23.8%)
83 (29.1%)
Sanhe
36 (25.3%)
45 (31.5%)
81 (28.4%)
Xinhua
0 (0%)
3 (2.1%)
3 (1.1%)
Yongxing
28 (19.7%)
0 (0%)
28 (9.8%)
Patients
Mean Age in
years (95% CI)

23.04
(19.37, 26.71)

28.47
(25.15, 31.79)

25.76
(23.29, 28.24)

T: -2.167

0.031

82 (57.7%)
33 (23.2%)
27 (19.0%)

45 (31.5%)
69 (48.3%)
29 (20.3%)

127 (44.6%)
102 (35.8%)
56 (19.7%)

X2:
23.554

<0.001

Gender
Male
Female

93 (65.5%)
49 (34.5%)

77 (53.9%)
66 (46.1%)

170 (59.7%)
115 (40.3%)

X2: 4.015

0.045

Prescriptions
Mean number of
drugs (95% CI)

5.32
(4.98, 5.67)

5.87
(5.46, 6.29)

5.60
(5.33, 5.87)

T: -2.027

0.044

Mean cost in yuan
(95% CI)

8.94
(6.93, 10.95)

5.70
(4.80, 6.60)

7.12
(6.09, 8.14)

T: 2.919

0.004

Injections
None
>1 injection

11 (7.7%)
131 (92.3%)

32 (22.4%)
111 (77.6%)

43 (15.1%)
242 (84.9%)

X2 :
11.905

0.001

104 (73.2%)
38 (26.8%)
142

97 (67.8%)
46 (32.2%)
143

201 (70.5%)
84 (29.5%)
285

X2: 1.002

0.317

Age ≤ 15
Age 16-45
Age > 46

Appropriateness
Appropriate
Inappropriate
Total number of
prescriptions
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Table 6 shows multiple linear regression of the number of medications prescribed
per patient visit with covariates of age, gender, village doctor, use of injections, insurance
status, and interaction between year and insurance. The adjusted correlation coefficient
for this model is 0.365. Analysis of village doctor reveals that Guaizhai, Sanhe, and
Yongxing prescribed significantly more medicines than Anping (βDuoyang=0.189, p=0.421;
βGuaizhai=0.691, p=0.002; βSanhe=1.099, p<0.001; βXinhua=0.476, p=0.112; βYongxing=1.688,
p<0.001).
Age was first analyzed as a continuous variable in this regression model, which
revealed a highly significant association between age and number of medications after
adjusting for other covariates (data not shown: β=0.009, p=0.004, overall model adjusted
R2=0.357). Subsequent age stratification, as shown in Table 6, reveals that for patients
below age 45, more medications are prescribed as age increases (age ≤ 15 β=0.067,
p=0.005; age 16-45 β=-0.062, p=0.048). However, for patients above age 46, there is no
significant correlation between age and number of medications (β=-0.016, p=0.375). As
for patient gender, it is not significantly associated with number of medications (β=0.265,
p=0.058).
Looking at other prescription characteristics in the regression reveals that number
of medications is significantly associated with injection use, year, insurance, and yearinsurance interaction. Use of injections is significantly positively associated with number
of medications (β=3.461, p<0.001). As hypothesized, there are significant associations
between number of medications and year and insurance category. After adjusting for
other factors, prescriptions in 2004 had more medications per visit than prescriptions in
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uninsured patients, regardless of CMS or RMHC insurance type (β=1.227, p<0.001). The
interaction between year and insurance was also significantly negatively associated with
number of medications (β=-1.011, p=0.001), indicating that the increase in number of
medications for insured patients as compared to uninsured patients was less for RMHC
than for CMS.

Table 6: Multiple Linear Regression of Number of Medications
Adjusted β
P-value
Village
(Anping as reference)
Duoyang
0.189
0.421
Guaizhai
0.691
0.002
Sanhe
1.099
<0.001
Xinhua
0.476
0.112
Yongxing
1.688
<0.001

-0.272, 0.651
0.250, 1.131
0.659, 1.539
-0.111, 1.064
1.177, 2.120

Age ≤ 15
Age 16-45
Age > 46

0.067
-0.062
-0.016

0.005
0.048
0.375

0.020, 0.113
-0.125, -0.001
-0.051, 0.019

Gender

0.265

0.058

-0.009, 0.540

Injection

3.461

<0.001

3.123, 3.800

Year

1.239

<0.001

0.753, 1.725

If insurance

1.227

<0.001

0.800, 1.653

Year * insurance
Adjusted R2 = 0.365

-1.011

0.001

-1.601, -0.422

95% CI

Multiple Linear Regression Analyses of Costs
Cost was log10 transformed to more closely approximate a normal distribution.
However, the Shapiro-Wilk test showed that neither cost nor log(cost) were normally
distributed (cost: z=12.158, p<0.001 and logcost: z=6.803, p<0.001). Table 7 shows
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injections, year, insurance status, and year-insurance interaction. The adjusted
correlation coefficient for this model is 0.442. Regarding village doctors, Guaizhai had
significantly lower costs than Anping, while Xinhua and Yongxing had higher costs
(βDuoyang=0.112, p=0.172; βGuaizhai=-0.177, p=0.020; βSanhe=-0.004, p=0.953; βXinhua=0.470,
p<0.001; βYongxing=0.528, p<0.001).
Cost was not significantly associated with age when age was analyzed as a
continuous variable (data not shown: β=0.001, p=0.147, overall model adjusted
R2=0.437). As shown in Table 7, cost also was not significantly associated with any
stratified age group (βage≤15=0.013, p=0.101; βage16-45=-0.011, p=0.312; βage>46=-0.008,
p=0.169). Gender was not significantly associated with logcost (β=0.023, p=0.622).
Cost statistically significantly increased as the number of medications increased
(β=0.158, p<0.001). Cost, however, was not significantly associated with use of
injections (β=0.053, p=0.452).
As hypothesized, cost was significantly associated with year (β=-0.272, p=0.003);
2004 post-RMHC mean costs were 0.53 yuan lower than 2003 pre-RMHC mean costs
after adjusting for all other factors. As for insurance, mean costs of prescriptions were on
average 3.01 yuan higher for insured patients than uninsured patients (β=0.478, p<0.001).
The interaction term for year and insurance also showed statistical significance with
logcost (β=-0.239, p=0.025), indicating that the increase in costs for insured patients as
compared to uninsured patients is less for RMHC than for CMS.
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Adjusted β
P-value
Village
(Anping as reference)
Duoyang
0.112
0.172
Guaizhai
-0.177
0.020
Sanhe
-0.004
0.953
Xinhua
0.470
<0.001
Yongxing
0.528
<0.001

-0.049, 0.274
-0.327, -0.028
-0.154, 0.145
0.273, 0.666
0.352, 0.703

Age ≤ 15
Age 16-45
Age > 46

0.013
-0.011
-0.008

0.101
0.312
0.169

-0.003, 0.029
-0.032, 0.010
-0.020, 0.003

Gender

0.023

0.622

-0.070, 0.117

Number of medications

0.158

<0.001

0.135, 0.181

Injection

0.053

0.452

-0.085, 0.191

Year

-0.272

0.003

-0.449, -0.095

If insurance

0.478

<0.001

0.318, 0.637

Year * insurance
Adjusted R2 = 0.442

-0.239

0.025

-0.447, -0.030

95% CI

Logistic Regression Analyses of Injection Use
Injection use is a binary variable dependent on whether any of the medications
written on a prescription sheet was injected as a shot or given intravenously. Table 8
shows logistic regression of injection use by covariates of age, gender, village doctor,
number of medications, year, insurance status, and interaction between year and
insurance. Adjusted odds ratios are listed. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test
was X28=9.61, p=0.294. Regarding village doctor, Xinhua had significantly higher odds
of injection use than Anping, while Yongxing had significantly lower odds of injection
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ORXinhua=3.392, p=0.007; ORYongxing=0.180, p<0.001).
Age as a continuous variable was significantly associated with injection use (data
not shown: OR=0.988, p=0.020, overall model X28=9.36, p=0.313). With analysis using
stratified age groups, older age, age > 46, was positively associated with injection use
(OR=1.077, p=0.015), but younger ages were not significantly associated with injection
use (ORage≤15=0.950, p=0.215; ORage16-45=1.019, p=0.732). Gender was not associated
with injections (OR=0.994, p=0.981).
As expected, use of injections significantly increased as number of medications
increased (OR=2.861, p<0.001). Use of injections significantly decreased from 2003 to
2004 after RMHC implementation (OR=0.139, p<0.001). Use of injections also
significantly decreased for insured patients as compared to uninsured patients (OR=0.239,
p=0.001). The interaction between year and insurance, however, is insignificant,
indicating that RMHC insurance did not have any more impact on injection use than
CMS insurance did (OR=1.290, p=0.641).

Table 8: Logistic Regression of Use of Injections
Adjusted OR
P-value
Village
(Anping as reference)
Duoyang
1.711
0.162
Guaizhai
0.992
0.981
Sanhe
0.758
0.462
Xinhua
3.932
0.007
Yongxing
0.180
<0.001

0.806, 3.632
0.493, 1.995
0.363, 1.583
1.458, 10.603
0.077, 0.423

Age ≤ 15
Age 16-45
Age > 46

0.877, 1.030
0.914, 1.136
1.015, 1.144

0.950
1.019
1.077

0.215
0.732
0.015

95% CI
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Adjusted OR
P-value
Gender
0.994
0.981

95% CI
0.617, 1.601

Number of medications

2.861

<0.001

2.415, 3.390

Year

0.139

<0.001

0.055, 0.349

If insurance

0.239

0.001

0.101, 0.570

Year * insurance
1.290
0.641
2
Hosmer-Lemeshow X (df 8) = 9.61, p = 0.294

0.442, 3.769

Logistic Regression Analyses of Inappropriate Prescriptions
Inappropriate prescribing is a binary variable representing the presence of any
inappropriately prescribed medications on a prescription sheet. Table 9 shows logistic
regression of inappropriate prescribing as a function of age, gender, village doctor,
injection use, number of medications, year, insurance status, and interaction between year
and insurance. Adjusted odds ratios are listed. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit
test was X28=4.02, p=0.855. Analysis of village doctor reveals that Duoyang and Sanhe
had significantly higher odds of inappropriate prescriptions than Anping
(ORDuoyang=2.593, p=0.001; ORGuaizhai=1.039, p=0.897; ORSanhe=2.077, p=0.009;
ORXinhua=0.890, p=0.772; ORYongxing=1.311, p=0.430).
Age as a continuous variable was not significantly associated with inappropriate
prescribing (data not shown: OR=0.995, p=0.233, overall model X28=5.52, p=0.701). By
contrast, analysis with stratified age groups show that age ≤ 15 and age 16-45 are both
significantly associated with inappropriate prescribing, but age > 46 is not
(ORage>46=0.981, p=0.376). For age ≤ 15, as age increased, the proportion of
inappropriate prescriptions actually decreased (ORage≤15=0.937, p=0.023), which was the
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associated with inappropriate prescribing; inappropriate prescribing was lower for female
patients (OR=0.657, p=0.013).
Injection use was not associated with inappropriate prescribing (OR=0.917,
p=0.743). As expected, inappropriate prescribing was significantly and positively
associated with number of medications (OR=1.253, p=<0.001). Contrary to hypothesis,
however, year, insurance status, and the interaction between the two were all not
significantly associated with inappropriate prescribing (ORYear=1.328, p=0.331;
ORIf insurance=0.869, p=0.589; ORYear*insurance=0.962, p=0.912).

Table 9: Logistic Regression of Inappropriate Prescribing
Adjusted OR
P-value
Village
(Anping as reference)
Duoyang
2.593
0.001
Guaizhai
1.039
0.897
Sanhe
2.077
0.009
Xinhua
0.890
0.772
Yongxing
1.311
0.430

1.481, 4.539
0.582, 1.854
1.120, 3.598
0.406, 1.953
0.669, 2.569

Age ≤ 15
Age 16-45
Age > 46

0.937
1.082
0.981

0.023
0.041
0.376

0.886, 0.991
1.003, 1.167
0.940, 1.023

Gender

0.657

0.013

0.473, 0.915

Number of medications

1.253

<0.001

1.154, 1.361

Injection

0.917

0.743

0.545, 1.542

Year

1.328

0.331

0.750, 2.351

If insurance

0.869

0.589

0.523, 1.445

Year * insurance
0.962
0.912
Hosmer-Lemeshow X2(df 8) = 4.02, p = 0.855

0.481, 1.924

95% CI

- 35 DISCUSSION
Study Findings
This pilot study’s purpose was to evaluate RMHC’s impact on physician
prescribing behavior. In this study, we analyzed 858 prescriptions from 6 village doctors,
with diagnoses limited to only “common cold”. Results show that RMHC significantly
lowered number of medications prescribed per visit and lowered prescription costs, but
RMHC did not change inappropriate prescribing or injection use.
Analysis of baseline demographic and patient characteristics revealed that patient
age, use of injections, and prescription costs were all significantly different between 2003
and 2004 (Table 2), between insured and uninsured patients (Table 3), between RMHC
and CMS enrolled patients (Table 4), and between uninsured patients during 2003 and
2004 (Table 5). The difference in age between groups is likely due to adverse selection
in enrollment, with more older patients enrolling in RMHC.35 The differences in
injection use and costs may be caused by stricter drug controls and standards created by
RMHC. Proportion of inappropriate prescriptions, however, did not significantly differ
between years and insurance categories.
Average costs after RMHC implementation, 7.22 yuan (US $0.90), were nearly
half of costs before RMHC implementation, 13.09 yuan (US $1.64). Under both
insurance systems, insured patients spent more on prescriptions than uninsured patients.
This likely reflects adverse selection seen in previous RMHC studies, where older and
sicker patients are more likely to enroll in RMHC.35 Also, insured patients are more
likely to use and overuse health services because of increased affordability. In addition,
doctors may prescribe more medications for insured patients to keep patients satisfied and
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Hong Kong doctors in 2003 found that many doctors, when asked about their own
behavior, thought they overused antibiotics: common reasons for overusing antibiotics
were patient satisfaction, fear of malpractice suits, and saving time.36 In particular, older
doctors, private practice doctors, and more senior doctors were more likely to report
this.36 Perhaps insured patients have more purchasing power and thus more influence on
doctors to prescribe newer, more expensive, or better medications.
As hypothesized, the regression model for cost showed a significant interaction
between year and insurance, a negative value, indicating that the cost difference between
insured and uninsured patients was less for RMHC. In addition, the regression model for
number of medications also showed a significant negative association between number of
medication and the year-insurance interaction term. Thus, RMHC seems better than
CMS in regulating overall costs and number of medications for insured patients as
compared to uninsured patients even with adverse selection. This finding agrees with this
study’s original hypothesis. These differences in mean costs are statistically associated
with number of medications and prescribing doctor. The strong relationship between
prescription costs and number of medications is expected, as is the fact that certain
doctors tend to have higher costs: Xinhua village and Yongxing village in particular.
After adjusting for all other factors, costs were still significantly associated with year and
with insurance status.
Contrary to original hypotheses, this study found no significant difference in the
proportion of inappropriate prescriptions by year or by insurance status. Even after
controlling for all other factors, there was no significant difference between effects of
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ORYear*insurance=0.962, p=0.912). As expected, increased number of medications is
strongly associated with increased odds of inappropriate prescriptions, roughly 1.25 times
higher odds per additional drug.
Logistic regression results show that number of medications, prescribing doctor,
patient age, and patient gender are all significantly associated with inappropriate
prescribing. In Table 9, the adjusted OR for gender was 0.657 (p=0.013), indicating that
female patients had lower odds of inappropriate prescriptions, which is quite interesting.
One possible explanation is that all village doctors were male and perhaps preferentially
over-prescribed for male patients. Alternatively, perhaps this study’s data sample was
too small and skewed. As for age, analysis with age as a continuous variable showed no
association with inappropriate prescriptions. However, analysis with stratified age
groups revealed a significant negative association between inappropriate prescribing and
age ≤ 15; a significant positive association between inappropriate prescribing and age 1645; but no significant association with inappropriate prescribing and age > 46. This could
once again be due to small sample size. Another possible explanation is that physicians
may be more cautious and careful in prescribing for pediatric patients whereas
prescribing for adult patients may be more influenced by patient finances or preference.
The fact that this study shows RMHC was successful in reducing number of
medications but not in reducing inappropriate prescribing is inconsistent. One would
assume that reducing the number of medications per visit would lower overprescribing of
unnecessary and/or redundant medications. This calls into question the accuracy of the
methods used to determine inappropriate prescribing. Insufficient sample size and study
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inappropriate prescribing. One major limitation to this study is that peer reviewers were
not blinded to village doctor. Prescriptions were also only judged by one peer reviewer,
and inter-observer scoring was not checked. A defined set of criteria for “inappropriate”
prescriptions was used by the 2 peer reviewers. The list of criteria should have been
straightforward and logical (incorrect use, dose, drug delivery method, drug interactions,
redundancy), but interpretation of the criteria was likely variable. Perhaps the peer
reviewers were unable to correctly judge the village doctors’ prescribing quality due to
similar levels of medical training. A more likely answer, however, is that the peer
reviewers had limited information about the clinical picture to correctly judge medication
appropriateness. For instance, insured RMHC records were required to have both
diagnoses and presenting symptoms, but uninsured records often only had diagnoses
listed. Village doctors may also have documented a higher severity of symptoms in order
to get fully reimbursed by RMHC. Furthermore, proper, systematic sampling of
prescriptions was quite difficult given inadequate record-keeping of certain village
doctors.
Fundamentally, a binary variable of inappropriate versus appropriate is a very
crude way of simplifying a complex process of diagnosis and treatment. Vitamin shots,
for example, could be judged as unnecessary but not inappropriate by one physician or
judged as unnecessary plus inappropriate by another physician. Using traditional Chinese
medicine and Western medicine for the same symptoms could also be seen as redundant
or complimentary. Other studies have found that physicians who provide more expensive
therapy out of financial incentives are not necessarily providing inappropriate

- 39 treatment.37 Thus, the “inappropriate prescribing” variable encompasses a large gray area
of decision-making that cannot be easily reduced to a binary variable.
On the other hand, another possible explanation is that RMHC actually does not
affect physician prescribing behavior. RMHC is structured around financial protection
for patients and not necessarily quality control. Thus, RMHC has an essential drug list to
decrease use of counterfeit, expired, and inappropriate drugs. However, few utilization
management measures are in place to change physician prescribing behavior. Perhaps
the decreased number of overall medications prescribed under RMHC represents a
decrease in appropriate as well as inappropriate medications. Furthermore, RMHC does
not focus on changing patient demand for medications, which can be a strong factor in
inappropriate prescribing of antibiotics and injections.

Study Strengths
The strengths of this pilot study are its focus on the impact of rural health
insurance on physician prescribing behavior and its findings regarding prescription costs
for common colds. Previous studies on RMHC have focused on insurance-specific topics
such as adverse selection,35 but none have examined the impact of RMHC on physician
prescribing behavior. This study showed the importance and feasibility of measuring
quantitative and qualitative changes in physician prescribing behavior under RMHC.
Results from this pilot study show that RMHC had dramatic effects on lowering the
number of medications prescribed per visit and decreasing prescription drug costs for
rural residents in Guizhou, the poorest province in China. Prescription drugs constitute
the largest portion of out-of-pocket medical expenses. Lowered drug costs should thus

- 40 greatly increase access to and affordability of health care. Although this study found no
change in inappropriate prescribing with RMHC, it demonstrates that evaluating
physician prescribing behavior is quite important. Not only does physician prescribing
behavior greatly influence the quality of patient care, but behavior also widely varies
depending on individual village doctor.

Study Limitations
In addition to those mentioned above, study limitations include poor data quality,
peer reviewer bias, and study design. Sample sizes were quite variable depending on
individual doctor and insurance category. Record-keeping for uninsured patients was
also quite poor: total number of prescriptions for uninsured patients was half that for
insured patients, and some village doctors had no prescriptions for the uninsured. In
addition, among the uninsured prescriptions, 31 were missing costs and 62 were missing
symptoms (likely used by peer reviewers to evaluate inappropriate prescribing). Copies
of these prescriptions were obtained directly from village doctors, who could have lost or
withheld prescriptions for this study. Small sample size and poor data quality might also
explain the lack of normal distribution for age and logcost. Percentages of inappropriate
prescribing per village doctor are strikingly different for this pilot study as compared to
the prior January-February 2004 RMHC evaluation. This difference could be due to
small sample sizes in this pilot study, flawed study design, and peer reviewer bias.
Peer reviewer bias may strongly affect study results. There were two physicians
reviewing all prescriptions for inappropriateness. Both worked at the local health
department in charge of the RMHC insurance program. Because these peer reviewers
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personal biases regarding specific doctors. Peer reviewers were also not blinded to study
aims or patient insurance status.
In the future, study design should be optimized. First, a larger study should be
done evaluating more than just 6 village doctors. The prior RMHC evaluation in
January-February 2004 reviewed 21 village health posts and 31 village doctors. Second,
physicians behave independently from each other, but all patients treated by the same
physician likely receive similar care. Given this, cluster analysis is the most appropriate
approach for evaluating village doctors. This study had only 6 clusters, which made
cluster analysis a poor choice for this study. Furthermore, cluster analysis should also
take into account multiple visits by the same patient. Insured patients and sick patients
who can afford care may visit doctors multiple times in a month, and these visits likely
result in similar prescriptions. Moreover, providers may encourage multiple visits to
increase RMHC reimbursements for fee-for-service. Thus, future studies should cluster
by individual doctors and individual patients. Lack of cluster analysis in this study
probably leads to underestimating the differences between village doctors and
overestimating the impact of RMHC on physician prescribing practices.
Lastly, this study attempted to evaluate the RMHC insurance program in 2004 by
comparing it to the old CMS insurance program in 2003. This method was akin to using
a retrospective control for RMHC insurance. A better way to evaluate RMHC would be
to compare and match villages currently with RMHC to villages currently without
RMHC to control for time, season, local disease patterns, and patient demographics.
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Future Studies
Analysis of cost and quality of care is essential to evaluating the overall success
of RMHC. Cost is a quantitative and easily obtained measure. Quality, however, as seen
in this study, is quite difficult to measure accurately. This pilot study found encouraging
results regarding RMHC’s ability to lower prescription drug costs for poor rural residents
in China. Future studies should explore the distribution of benefits and see if financial
protection favors the poor or the rich. Other diagnoses in addition to “common cold”
should be studied to see if costs and prescription error rates differ by disease. Analyses
with larger sample sizes, more clusters of village doctors and individual patient clusters
would be useful. Future studies could also study several other quality of care variables
such as antibiotic usage or appropriate tuberculosis treatment. Other considerations are
specific village doctor characteristics such as doctor age, years of training, years of
practice, satisfaction with reimbursement policies, and overall satisfaction with RMHC.
These could be significant confounders in any cost or quality analysis.
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RMHC is an experimental health insurance program in rural China that focuses on
primary care. Its unique focus on outpatient and preventive services makes RMHC an
appealing alternative to other NCMS programs focused solely on catastrophic inpatient
coverage. If RMHC succeeds, it will become an important example for NCMS
development in rural China. Determinants of success include sustainability, financial
protection for patients, improved access to health care, and, ultimately, improved health
outcomes. This pilot study shows that RMHC does indeed lower drug costs for patients
and thus increases financial protection for poor, rural residents. RMHC’s cost-control
success in even the poorest province of China, Guizhou, bodes well for RMHC feasibility
and success in other, less poor rural areas. Access and quality of care, however, need to
be studied in greater detail. Rural Mutual Health Care seems to be a viable option for the
rest of rural China, provided that its short-term success in controlling costs can be
sustained and its quality control measures can be expanded.
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